Ultra-mini abstract: Time-outs have become an important tool in patient safety in the operating room. 39
Despite the improvements though, patients are still harmed. We utilized a novel accident analysis 40 technique to identify time-out improvements and systemic changes to promote safety in cardiac 41 surgery. 42 43 44 beyond individual error and examines the contextual, social, and organizational influences on human 116 behavior. The philosophy behind CAST is that human behavior is influenced by the environment in which 117 it occurs. Assigning blame to doctors, nurses, and technicians will not prevent future incidents unless 118 the environmental determinants of the behavior, the systemic factors, involved are identified and 119 corrected. 120
CAST (and systems theory in general) is based on the system-theoretic principle that accidents are not 121 just the result of individual system component failures or errors but more generally result from 122 inadequate enforcement of constraints on the behavior of the system components. Examples of safety 123 constraints are that pre-emptive immunosuppression must be administered to patients before receiving 124 a heart transplant or that all required equipment must be available during cardiac surgery. 125
The safety constraints are enforced by controls. Controls include such things as physical and logical 126 design to reduce or eliminate common errors, checklists, performance audits, altering the order of steps 127 in a procedure to reduce the risk of skipping some, and changing incentive structures (i.e., aligning 128 individual incentives with system-level goals). In general, controls may be physical, procedural, or social. 129
Losses result when the controls are inadequate and flaws in the overall system design and in the 130 interactions among the system components violate the safety constraints. Safety is treated not as a 131 human reliability problem but as a control problem where the system design should prevent (control) 132 unsafe behavior. 133
The basic philosophy in CAST is that identifying the mistakes people make and going no further, which 134 is often the result of root cause analysis performed on adverse events in hospitals, does not provide the 135 information needed to prevent future losses. Most people want to do a good job. While in hindsight 136 their behavior may appear to involve "mistakes," at the time they were trying to do the right thing 6 . To 137 get the information necessary to change the work context to one that increases safe behavior, we must 138 understand why it made sense to those involved to act the way they did when the behavior, in 139 hindsight, turns out to be unsafe. 140
People's behavior is affected by the context in which it occurs. Therefore the first step in identifying 141 why particular behavior occurred is to identify the contextual influences that determined or influenced 142 it. Then, to change behavior, we change the context. That is the "systems" approach to accident 143
reduction. 144
Behavior is also affected by our mental models of the state of the process being controlled. The individual feedback control loops are part of a larger hierarchical control structure. Figure 2  155 shows a model of the control system (feedback and communication loops) used to control surgical 156 medication errors at the hospital where the adverse events occurred. The model shows the system as it 157 is assumed to work under ideal conditions. It will differ for each hospital, depending on the particular 158 processes used. Accidents and incidents occur when the control structure (i.e., the designed controls) 159 does not enforce the safety constraints on the system operation, assuming that the controller did not 160 intentionally harm the patient. 161
162
Figure 2: The safety control structure to protect against pre-operative medication errors 163
Each "controller" in the system has specific responsibilities with respect to safety. Each also has a 164 model of the process being controlled (not all shown in Figure 2 ) that will impact how well the safety-165 related responsibilities are carried out. Note that the attending cardiac surgeon and the surgery fellow 166 both have responsibility for ordering medications, which could potentially lead to confusion and 167 omission of required actions. 168
This kind of CAST analysis was conducted on every one of the 30 cases identified by the MIT systems 169 engineering specialists (ALS & NL). 170
Results

171
Out of 380 consecutive complex cardiac surgeries, 30 adverse events occurred. Patient outcomes in 172 those adverse events ranged from patient death to prolonged anesthetic time with no clinically 173 observable consequences; outcomes are tabulated in Table 2 . In all of these cases, 100% checklist 174 compliance was documented by the nursing staff. 175
Incidents fell into several different categories, collated in Table 3 . The CAST analyses on these 176 incidents identified ways to improve the checklists. It also identified additional protection needed to 177 prevent events that cannot be consistently prevented by using a checklist. While the "symptoms", e.g., 178 specific adverse events, differed greatly among the categories, the systemic causal factors were very 179 similar, therefore demonstrating that fixing a few systemic factors can potentially reduce whole 180 categories of adverse events. 181
Missing Medications 182
There were four instances of missing medications: three cases of missing immunosuppression 183 preoperatively and one case of a delay in heparin dosing. In the cases of missing immunosuppression, all 184 of the patients had orders written for immunosuppression but somehow never received it before 185 entering the operating room. A major driver of these incidents was a lack of feedback specifically related 186 to the electronic health record (EHR) and the timeout. The immunosuppression was ordered the night 187 before surgery as part of a preoperative order set. This order set includes a combination of orders to be 188 given at different times and by different people. Some orders are meant to be carried out by the 189 intensive care nurse an hour before the patient goes, and others, such as antibiotics, are meant to be 190 carried out by the anesthesiologist in the operating room. Usually this ambiguity is not a problem 191 because the teams are used to carrying out these orders. Complicating these scenarios was that cardiac 192 transplants were relatively infrequent until a recent change in leadership. The intensive care nurses had 193 not given immunosuppression before and likely did not realize that this was their responsibility. 194
Additionally, these were performed after-hours, when the pharmacy dispensing medications was at a 195 remote location. 196
Compounding the lack of feedback is the difficulty in seeing whether an order has been carried out in 197 the EHR. To see this, one has to compare the orders to the Medication Administration Record (MAR), 198 which is on an entirely separate screen. There was no obvious signal to the surgical team that an order 199 has been placed but not filled. These gaps were identified a few months later, after detailed searching of 200 the EMR by the bio-informatics expert (MO), focusing on the actual times when the immunosuppressive 201 medications were truly administered. 202
Missing Equipment and Missing Implants 203
Out of the 30 incidents, eight involved missing equipment and an additional three involved missing 204 implants. Typically, missing equipment cases involved less common procedures where the setup was 205 missing a specialized piece of equipment. Cases involving missing implants were all valve replacement 206 cases where the surgical team could not obtain a properly sized valve. Cases arising from missing 207 equipment typically shared similar proximal events with a wide variety of contributing factors. The 208 proximal events were that the physician either requested the wrong equipment or the nurse did not 209 retrieve all of the equipment or the correct equipment for the case. 210
Relieving Nurse Unaware of Cardiac Procedures 211
There were four incidents where the relieving circulating nurse did not have the skill set necessary to 212 work in the cardiac surgery operating room. They did not know where to find or how to use specialized 213 cardiac equipment. 214
Improperly Handled Equipment 215
There were nine instances of mishandled equipment. The OR staff frequently incorrectly believed 216 that the equipment was broken, when in reality it was set up improperly. It is easy here to say that the 217 nurse was responsible, but the biomedical engineer and the surgeon also believed the equipment to be 218 broken. In most of these cases, it was not until after the procedure when the team met with the 219 company representative that they realized the device was just set up incorrectly. These incidents raise 220 the question of device design and training. 221
Analysis of Recommendations 222
In analyzing these incidents, we came up with recommendations for preventing future accidents 223 based off of the identified causal factors. There was an average of 3.9 recommendations generated for 224 each accident scenario. We further analyzed these recommendations by coding them using the VA 225 Analyzing these accidents with CAST not only provided insight not only into the limitations of checklists 247 and how they need to be supplemented to prevent more adverse events, but also, fundamentally, into 248 the limitations of defense-in-depth thinking for modeling and controlling healthcare risks. As one 249 example, the government of Ontario, Canada, recently mandated implementation of surgical safety 250 checklists at all hospitals in an effort to improve patient safety, as the insertion of an additional layer of 251 defense against adverse events. In this diverse population, the WHO surgical checklist failed to reduce 252 mortality and morbidity in a wide range of surgical patients While checklists and standardized procedures do play a role in aviation safety, their use is a small part 264 of the reason for the low accident rate in flying today. For example, aircraft are designed using a "fail-265 safe" principle so that failures of physical components, human errors, or flaws in implementing 266 operational procedures (including checklists) will not, by themselves, lead to an accident. The success of 267 checklists in aviation depends on the careful analysis and design that goes into the entire system design, 268 as well as on human ingenuity in selecting and applying and even modifying standard procedures and 269 checklists. That is, checklists are only effective in commercial aviation because the larger system is 270 engineered to protect against human fallibility. Attributing the success of aviation safety to the use of 271 checklists or placing too much reliance on them for healthcare safety would be a tremendous mistake. 272
The overuse of checklists without making system changes is beginning to be recognized in healthcare 273 too. Drs. Stock and Sundt recently published an editorial arguing that more than just checklists are 274 needed to prevent accidents 10 . Additionally, there is a need to show that checklists actually help avoid 275 major adverse events, otherwise surgical teams may just view them as wasteful impositions 11 . Accidents 276 are not only caused by lapses in memory, so a tool that is designed to serve as a memory aid will not 277 protect patients throughout their hospital stay. 278
279
As it relates to missing equipment, it might be best to ask about specific equipment that is different 280 than what is used in more routine cases. The specific question on the timeout is phrased as "Do we 281 require any equipment, implants, radiology films, or are there any special requirements for this 282 patient?" The question is too general to serve as a memory aid by highlighting any particular piece of 283 missing equipment. Additionally, it is a stacked question, meaning that one question is actually asking 284 for multiple answers. Human factors studies show that stacked questions like this one make it more 285 likely that respondents will miss specific parts of the general question 11 . 286
There were instances where cross covering nurses were not familiar with cardiac procedures. It is easy 287 to say that the nurses were inadequately trained and that it was a problem of just a few inadequately 288 trained personnel. However, the same incident happened four times with four different nurses and 289 saying that it was simply a matter of poorly trained nurses will not prevent this from happening a fifth 290 time or more. These incidents were reported to the nursing hierarchy and assurances obtained about 291 avoiding repetitions. Adequate training and competency verification of staff in complex cardiac surgery 292 suites falls to the institutional clinical educational department with monthly review to keep staff 293 properly trained. 294
Identifying the systemic factors involved and fixing these factors requires moving to higher levels of 295 control in the system. Why were these nurses, who were not trained in cardiac surgery, working in the 296 cardiac surgery operating rooms? Analysis of the managerial levels highlights that there is a policy 297 against non-cardiac nurses being assigned to the cardiac rooms, even as relieving nurses. However, this 298 policy is balanced by budgetary and staffing constraints. There is a constant message from upper level 299 management that making staff work overtime breaks the budget and hurts the organization. How then 300 is the nurse manager supposed to keep the operating room staffed with appropriately trained staff? 301
These conflicting system goals-safety through using appropriately trained staff and financial 302 constraints limiting overtime payment-need to be discussed and prioritized at the highest levels of 303 hospital leadership before this problem will truly be prevented in the future. In terms of missing 304 equipment such as valve implants, these were related to recent use of the sized implants. Alternate 305 implants were used made by a different manufacturer. Feedback was provided to the nursing hierarchy 306 and the supply chain management group in each instance. Additional redundancy measures were 307 introduced, such as immediate re-ordering of the valve implant by the circulating nurse and cross-308 checking of all implants prior to commencement of cases. 309
Medical devices are notoriously designed with little thought given to the usability and their integration 310 into the existing workflow. Equipment should have as simple a design as possible, with clear labels and 311 diagrams. Solutions that focus on making the equipment less error prone would prevent just such 312 incidents in the future. Why, then, is medical equipment not designed using knowledge of human 313 factors and error proneness? Medical device companies have little incentive to change the design if 314 health systems buy the devices regardless of the design. The companies may not even know about the 315 incidents raised by their equipment without this type of feedback. Doctors and hospitals need to start 316 pushing for better designs and stop settling for products that they know have design flaws regardless of 317 the time and budget pressure placed on these purchases. 318
The checklist and timeout are designed to be a communication tool common to all operating rooms. 319 Therefore, at this medical center, every operating room uses the same timeout checklist, a modified 320 WHO Surgical Safety Checklist. However, because this is a general checklist, there is no question 321 specifically asking about immunosuppression. The timeout is not an effective tool for catching this type 322 of error the way that it is currently designed. 323
One lesson that can be learned is that checklists need to be tailored to the specific task being 324 performed, in this case cardiac surgery. Questions about deep vein thrombosis prophylaxis may have 325 limited relevance, for example. The rote use of stock questions may take up time and decrease the 326 likelihood that key OR personnel will be fully attentive to the entire checklist. Additional questions that 327 are relevant, such as in some of these cases, preoperative immunosuppression, need to be added. 328
Adding questions though is a difficult task. There is a compromise between adding questions to cover 329 more content and making the checklist so long, such that the user does not complete it entirely. Finally, 330 there need to be changes to the format of the checklist to increase its usability. These changes include 331 separating stacked questions and creating more close-ended questions. 332
However, making these changes to the checklist would not have prevented all the adverse events. 333
The CAST analysis discovered systemic causes at both the local level as well as at higher levels of the 334 system safety control structure. For example, management of change procedures need to be instituted 335 and used when changes are made in standard practices, such as, in this case, an increase in cardiac 336 transplant surgery. Risks of changes should be evaluated and proper design of procedures and 337 instruction provided to ensure that new risks are not introduced by the change. 338
Other recommended changes are listed in Table 4 . Many of the higher control level 339 recommendations would prevent accidents of many different types. For example, implementing a 340 strong incident reporting system with formal investigations may have prevented the repetitive incidents. 341
The UO (Unexpected Occurrence) forms were infrequently filled out in these 30 adverse events, 342
suggesting that the mechanisms set in place by the administration were not being utilized properly. 343
Would unsafe staffing levels be a problem if safety took priority over cost in all managerial decision 344 making? Additionally, many of the identified changes with these analyses fell into the "stronger actions" 345 categorization, suggesting that they would be more effective at preventing these accidents in the future 346 than merely training or reminding staff of how to properly perform their jobs. Until these changes at all 347 levels of the system are made to eliminate the systemic factors in adverse events, we will continue to 348 see problems at the lower levels with unsafe staffing, inadequate training, insufficient stock, poor design 349 of equipment and computer records, and blood banks located a block away from where blood is most 350 needed. It is our plan to repeat this study to evaluate effects of these changes, over a 2-year period. 365
Conclusions 366
Timeouts and checklists can play a role in patient safety. Their use in these cases, however, did not 367 prevent the adverse events that occurred. The fact that accidents happen despite having implemented a 368 preoperative checklist goes beyond merely an issue with checklist compliance or even checklist design. 369
Part of the solution is to improve the checklists, as suggested in this paper and others. But an improved 370 checklist will not prevent most of the causal factors identified in this research and may not be the best 371 way to solve them even if it could. Solutions need to move beyond the local level where the checklist 372 acts and into the overall system design and controls to truly be effective. These changes would have the 373 added benefit of improving care throughout the entire health system and not just surgical care. 374 A checklist is only one of the tools in our arsenal for improving patient safety. Identifying the systemic 375 factors in adverse events and correcting them could have a major impact on patient safety. 376 377 378 Acknowledgements: Dr. Jai Raman and Prof. Nancy Leveson had full access to all the data in the study 379 and take responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the data analysis. There are no 380 conflicts of interest associated with this work. No external funding was involved. 381 
